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Abstract 
International investment arbitration is in a controversial state. While the systems put into place by 
various treaties allow an investor to protect their investments directly by initiating proceedings 
against a government, claims of arbitrator bias are supported by the fact that arbitrators are 
appointed by the parties. There are transparency concerns which contribute to arbitrators being 
biased towards investors from developed countries. The regime of international investment 
arbitration is heading towards either abolition or reform. The European Union, being the partner to 
more investment treaties than any other country, proposes the creation of a multilateral investment 
court. As a structured arbitration court, there may be less bias than the current regime of investment 
arbitration as proceedings would be more transparent and open to the public, binding precedent 
would leave less grey area in decisions and add consistency to rulings, and judges no longer being 
appointed by the parties removes any incentive to rule in favour of their appointing party to secure 
future appointments. Together with an appeals system, this proposed structure purports to be a 
positive change in ISDS. However as the essay will show, this approach is not likely to be attractive to 
the majority of states who are interested in protecting their right to govern. These issues will need to 
be addressed if the investment court proposal is going to gain support. 
Keywords: International Investment Arbitration, Bias, Multilateral Investment court, European 
Union, Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
Introduction 
International arbitration is an interesting legal and practical area of the law. While 
countries may consent in a treaty to hear any investor-state dispute at a neutral 
tribunal (usually following the rules of either the Washington Convention, UNCITRAL, 
or other specialised institutions like the permanent court of arbitration) the fact is that 
governments often dislike losing control of the proceedings. An investment dispute 
may be heard far away from the state or investor’s home, by arbitrators who may not 
have full knowledge of the parties or the business. Particularly since 2007 there has 
been growing concern and controversy from central governments over the perceived 
lack of legitimacy, transparency and neutrality of arbitral institutions and the investor-
state dispute settlement (ISDS) system as a whole. This is especially concerning when 
cases gain significant public notoriety and decisions ought to consider public policy or 
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environmental concerns that are unrepresented. These disputes typically begin with 
an investor claiming that a country, by passing laws or regulations, has breached its 
obligations under an investment treaty. Because international investment arbitration 
can be seen as ‘second-guessing’ or being sovereign over the regulatory actions of 
governments, the balance between state sovereignty and protecting the legitimate 
expectations of investors must be maintained. This delicate balance can be upset by 
concerns of illegitimacy in arbitral tribunals arising from investor bias. Cases like 
Phillip Morris Asia v Australia1, where Australia’s anti-smoking regulations harmed 
the profits of a foreign cigarette company, and Vattenfall v Germany 2 , where 
Germany’s move away from nuclear power damaged overseas investments, highlight 
the delicate balance in question and the discreet manner in which such disputes ought 
to be approached. The appearance of bias can harm the legitimacy of arbitral 
institutions but also implicates the ISDS system as a whole. Solving the problem of bias 
will enhance the legitimacy and trust in the system. Some organisations have called for 
substantial reform of the ISDS. Other entities, such as the European Union, propose a 
total replacement of the investment arbitration system.  
This essay will outline the current controversial state of international investment 
arbitration with the aim of solidifying the key concerns that there is bias or the 
appearance of bias in the current system of investment arbitration. It will first examine 
studies that indicate there is an appearance of bias in international investment 
arbitration, and explore how this appearance has influenced state governments. It will 
then examine the European Union’s proposal for a multilateral investment court and 
explore some ways in which its design would make it more neutral, unbiased and 
legitimate while examining potential illegitimacies and biases that may arise. 
The appearance of bias in international investment arbitration. 
The question of whether there is bias in the system of ISDS or whether it is merely an 
appearance of bias is the first step on the road to improving the legitimacy of the ISDS 
system. Even the appearance of bias can damage the legitimacy of arbitral institutions 
in the eyes of governments, academics and the general public. A further question is 
who the bias favours. There is a growing suspicion of unjust favour to investors, 
particularly those from developed countries, over states3. Because arbitrators in ISDS 
are typically nominated by the parties, the arbitrators can gain a reputation for being 
either investor-friendly or host state-friendly as they are motivated to secure future 
appointments. The effect of bias can have significant effects on the outcome of a case. 
One study estimates that if an investor is a national of an advanced economy and has 
had experience working in government, they are 25% more likely to receive an award 
of damages4. However studies are split on whether bias actually exists. One claims that 
statistics show arbitrators to favour claimant investors, particularly investors from 
developed western states, over respondent states5. However another study failed to 
 
1 Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-12. 
2 Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12. 
3 Chin, L, Ho, Jean, Paparinskis, Mārtiņš, International Investment Law and Arbitration: commentary, awards 
and other materials (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2017) pp75-76. 
4 Strezhnev, A (2016) Detecting Bias in international Investment Arbitration, Harvard University Department of 
Government. 
5 G. V Harten ‘Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study of Investment Treaty 





find such a statistical link6. Another study conducted by the Kiel Institute examined 
the claim that arbitrators are biased towards their nominated parties7. That study 
highlighted the fact that the perceived legitimacy crisis of ISDS is often attributed to 
ad-hoc arbitration tribunals that are composed of arbitrators who, perceived as acting 
in their own self-interest and under opaque circumstances, are tempted to award in 
favour of their nominating party. The study used ISDS-related information collected 
by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development from over 700 cases, 
and concluded that the probability of investor wins increases when presidents of 
arbitration tribunals are ‘biased’ in the sense that they predominantly served as 
claimant-appointed arbitrators in previous cases. While the study found this effect to 
be diminished when arbitrators have more experience, bias remains a concern in many 
states’ assessments of the legitimacy of the ISDS system. The following sections will 
examine how this distrust in the ISDS system developed, spread and eventually 
crystallised in actions taken by state governments.  
Dissatisfaction in the current state of investment treaty 
arbitration  
The current state of dissatisfaction in investment arbitration can be traced back to the 
1990’s. Bilateral investment treaties (BIT’s) were being adopted the world over for their 
uses in diplomatic relation, political publicity and enabling foreign investment. An 
early sign of the backlash to arbitration was in 2001 when the USA, Canadian and 
Mexican authorities issued a binding interpretation of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement. This clarified, among other things, that the minimum standard of 
treatment to be afforded to investors under the agreement was to be the minimum 
standard prescribed by customary international law and the standard of Fair and 
Equitable treatment afforded to investors need not exceed this minimum standard8. 
This was in response to several claims under section 11 that were ruled in favour of the 
investor, such as Pope & Talbot9. These cases found that ‘fair and equitable treatment’ 
encompasses a much broader area than originally intended by the state parties10. This 
rebalance demonstrates a conscious change by governments to move power away from 
investors in favour of enhancing a state’s right to regulate. While the reasons for this 
rebalance were partly in response to claims filed against the USA, there were also non-
political reasons for the rebalancing. As Charles Brower discusses, the Fair-Trade 
Commission (a body set out by the NAFTA and composed of representatives of the 
state parties) issued the binding interpretation in response to interpretive questions 
arising from vagueness in the original agreement11. This change was enhanced when 
the USA created a new model BIT in 2004. As Judge Schwebel explains, this new model 
represented a significant change in their foreign policy when compared with their 
previous 1984 model BIT 12. The USA now offered less far-reaching protections to 
 
6 S.D Franck ‘Development and outcomes of investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2009) 50, Harvard International Law 
Journal pp439, part V. 
7 J. Donaubauer, E. Neumayer, P. Nunnenkamp ‘Working paper; Winning or losing in investor-to-state dispute 
resolution: The role of arbitrator bias and experience’ (2017), Kiel Working paper, No. 2074, Kiel Institute for the 
World Economy (IfW) pp. 2-3. 
8 Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions (NAFTA Free Trade Commission, July 31, 2001) s2 
9 POPE & TALBOT, INC. v. HAWN(1953) No. 13 
10 See also Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 
, & S.D Meyers Inc v Canada UNCITRAL (1976). 
11 Charles H. Brower, II, Why the FTC Notes of Interpretation Constitute a Partial Amendment of NAFTA Article 
1105, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 347 (2006). 
12 Schwebel, S, Keynote address at the Tweltfh ITF Public Conference London, 15 May 2009, British Institute of 
International & Comparative Law. 
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investors and instead promised to provide no more than what was customarily 
provided in international law. This was in stark contrast to the 1984 model, as the 
minimum standard offered by customary international law became the maximum 
amount of protection instead of the minimum. The 2004 model replaced the usual 
substantive protections offered with a minimum standard of which there is no official 
consensus. While this was an attempt to narrow the scope of protection it remains 
vague. This vagueness allows for conflicting interpretations at arbitration tribunals, 
which could provide opportunities for bias to manifest.  
By 2007 this official dissatisfaction with the system of ISDS had spread outside the 
USA. Academics, reporters and arbitrators suggested that this spread was enhanced 
not only by the substantive protections that treaties provide but also by the procedural 
behaviour of arbitral tribunals 13 . Criticism by academics of the procedural and 
substantive rules contributed to the perception that the investment arbitration regime 
was unfit14. Another factor related to the bias is that the arbitration tribunals were often 
carried on in secret when there were numerous public policy considerations that ought 
to be heard. This alleged lack of democratic accountability gave rise to a growing 
concern that international arbitration was losing its edge over domestic courts, 
contributing to its insufficient legitimacy. Another symptom and result of this 
perceived lack of legitimacy was the denunciations of the ICSID convention, first by 
Bolivia in 2007, and soon followed by Ecuador in 2010 and Vanuzuela in 2012. The 
reasons for this were the alleged bias, lack of an appeals mechanism and the 
confidentiality of the ICSID proceedings15. Soon after states began to terminate their 
BIT’s. In 2012 South Africa began to terminate its European BIT’s. In 2014 Indonesia 
announced its intention to terminate its BIT with the Netherlands and added that it 
would no longer conclude investment treaties. These terminations offer investor 
protections in their termination provisions, usually lasting for ten years16. It should 
also be noted that there is a thin line between outright termination and renegotiation. 
However for the most part, treaties were usually terminated in accordance with their 
termination provisions, providing for continued investor protection after termination. 
Dissatisfaction with international investment arbitration is seen worldwide in official 
circles and seems to be based on perceived illegitimacy arising from confidential 
proceedings and systemic bias, and manifests in withdrawal from arbitration and 
investment treaties altogether.  
IV: Attempts to ‘fix’ the arbitration regime 
There have been attempts to ‘fix’ the arbitration regime. Transparency has improved 
with the introduction of amicus curiae briefs submitted by the public. NAFTA also 
began to hold public hearings 17. However pleadings and decisions often remained 
confidential, making meaningful public participation difficult. This reduces the 
transparency of the proceedings and gives rise to the possibility of bias. Another 
attempt to reduce bias was seen with the creation of the US 2012 model BIT, which was 
 
13 As 3, p 483. 
14 M. Waibel , A. Kaushal, L. Kyo-Hwa Chung and C. Blachin, ‘The Backlash against Investment Arbitrtations: 
Perceptions and Reality’ in M. Waibel , A. Kaushal, L. Kyo-Hwa Chung and C. Blachin (eds), The Backlash against 
Investment Arbitration (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2010), xxxvii-xxxviii, xl-xli, xlix. 
15 M. Sornarajah, Resistance and Change in the International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge University 
Press, 2015), pp 399-400. 
16 A Carska-Sheppard, ‘Issues Relevant to the Termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (2009), 26 J Int’l Arb. 
755, 755-756, 758-759, 761-763. 





intended to be more protective of the host government’s regulatory authority and 
discretion. The new features in the 2012 model make the burdens imposed on 
governments and the defences available clearer, and add new language regarding 
issues of public concern such as labour and environmental issues18. It also creates 
better public awareness and participation in proceedings. All of these new features 
represent a positive change in treaties that ‘flesh out’ the protections by adding more 
specific and clarifying language. New treaty rules that have since emerged have seen a 
trend of being more specific while still allowing for certain flexibility. An example is 
the 2016 rebalance of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). 
The new agreement contained clauses that spelled out specifically what the 
characteristics of fair and equitable treatment are, which reflected many of the bases 
for usual claims of breaches of that standard19. It also spelled out what, exactly, would 
constitute a breach of an investor’s legitimate expectations20. It is also suggested that 
China is making its new generation of BIT’s adhere to international standards, which 
makes the rules more certain 21 . Procedural innovations have also developed, and 
include penalisation of frivolous claims, introduction of bespoke arbitrator rules of 
conduct, and adherence to the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency22. The rules on 
transparency represent a shift from the presumption of privacy in ISDS to one of 
openness23. These changes demonstrate a continued attempt by states to clarify the 
standards of protection in an attempt to remove any potential for bias or conflicts of 
interest. If this trend continues it is possible that these reforms would be sufficient to 
minimise bias.  
European Union proposal for a multilateral investment court 
The European Union is in an, at least informally, authoritative position when it comes 
to ISDS and investment treaties. Germany and Pakistan concluded the first BIT, and 
EU member states are partner to many existing BIT’s. The European Union already 
provides for appellate mechanisms, which would enhance predicability and 
coherence 24 , in their investment treaties since 2004. While these have not been 
vigorously implemented there is always the possibility that they will be included in a 
multilateral investment court system in the future. The European Union proposes 
replacing international investment arbitration with an international ‘investment 
court’. This would likely be adopted in the EU’s current and future investment 
agreements. A communication by the European Commission identified transparency, 
consistency, predictability and the possibility to appeal as challenges that would be 
addressed in the EU’s investment policy25. Improvement in each of these areas would 
potentially reduce bias. To these ends, and following growing concern about the 
perceived insufficient legitimacy, neutrality and transparency of ISDS, the EU 
proposed the replacement of ISDS with an Investment Court System (ICC). This would 
 
18 L. Johnson, ‘The 2012 US Model BIT and What the Changes (or Lack Thereof) Suggest about Future Investment 
Treaties’, Political Risk Insurance Newsletter, vol. VIII, Issue 2, November 2012. 
19 CETA (2016) Art. 8.10(2)(a)-(f). 
20 As 19, Art. 8.10(4). 
21 W. Shan, H, Chen, ‘China-US BIT Negotiation and the Emerging Chinese BIT 4.0’ in C.L. Lim (ed.), Alternative 
Visions of the International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge University Press, 2016), 223, 238. 
22 2014. 
23 L. Johnson, N. Bernasconi-Osterwalder, ‘New UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules on Transparency: Application, 
Content and Next Steps’ (CIEL, IISD, CCSI, August 2013. 
24 J. Karl, ‘An Appellate Body for International Investment Disputes: How Appealing Is It?’, Columbia FDI 
Perspectives, No. 147, 11 May 2015. 
25 European Commission, COM (2010) 343 ‘Towards a comprehensive European international investment 
policy’. 
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have a first instance and appeal tribunal, permanent judges appointed by the EU and 
its investment partners, and work openly and transparently26. The EU has had this 
policy since 2014, and multilateral ISDS mechanisms have been provided for in the 
CETA and the Vietnam-EU FTA. One factor that would reduce bias is the quality and 
appointment of the judges in the MIC. The TTIP provisions which would likely be 
mirrored in the MIC state that judges are bound to strict codes of conduct and must be 
independent and unbiased27. There is also a mechanism available for parties to raise 
possible conflicts of interest. The decisions of the MIC would presumably be open to 
any countries. This presents an issue when multilaterally enforcing strictly bilateral yet 
similar agreements. Countries that have previously shown a reluctance to adhere to 
multilateral agreements may be reluctant to submit to a court that operates on 
precedent regarding different agreements. The MIC also consolidates power to states, 
potentially making the court more biased in favour of host states. However as Roberts 
suggests, this particular notion of bias results from a view of states as host states rather 
than the more accurate perception of states as treaty parties that have an interest in 
investor protection also 28 . Another issue is that an imposed MIC would remove 
competition in the free market and result in stagnation. However if the MIC turns out 
to be unpopular states are free to negotiate an exit from its jurisdiction. 
Conclusions 
While the appellate mechanism, codes of conduct and overseas enforcement features 
of the proposed MIC are likely to address the growing concern of bias, conflict of 
interest, and insufficient legitimacy in ISDS, the fact is that the proposed features could 
be implemented into the existing system without having to upend it completely. This 
alternative approach would likely be more attractive to state governments sharing the 
concern that ISDS is in need of reform.  
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